writers have drawn far too flattering a picture of human character, and leave upon us the impression, that, because mankind possess feelings of complacency on the contemplation of virtue, they are therefore possessed of virtue itself.

The view now offered of conscience, from the way in which we have been obliged to state it, may seem a very complex one. In reality, it is very simple. It is to be regretted that, in giving a description of any mental state, we are constrained to use language which sounds so abstract and metaphysical. The conscience is the mind looking to a moral law, and pronouncing judgments giving rise to emotions. We do not see how anything could be simpler.

The writer who is generally acknowledged to have written in the most masterly way on the conscience, seems to have viewed it at times at least, in all the lights in which we have now presented it. He calls it again and again a "principle/' and a " law/' the " principle of reflection and conscience/' and the " law* of his creation," a " determinate rule/' " the guide of life, and that by which men are a law unto themselves;" and affirms, that " every man may find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it/' That he regarded the conscience as partaking both of the nature of a faculty and a feeling, is evident from his calling it a " faculty in the heart," and more particularly from the following passage:—" It is manifest, that great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed on the supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason, whether considered as a *sentiment of the understanding, or a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both*"

We have a complete view of the conscience only when we look at it under this threefold aspect, in this its triune nature. In each of these characters it serves a separate

purpose. As looking to law, it gives to morality a clearly defined, a solid and consistent shape, and an authoritative power. When duty is presented merely as emotion, we have an impression that it might change with changing circumstances or with man's changing feelings, and might be tempted with Eousseau, to recommend as right, whatever recommended itself to our sentiments. But when it knows that there is a law, the mind feels